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Abstract
Social cognition is a key feature of human-level intel-
ligence. However, social reasoning faculties are rarely
included in cognitive systems. To encourage research in
this direction, we introduce a practical, computational
framework that enables socially aware inference. We
demonstrate the framework’s ability to model a com-
mon, complex, and under-investigated aspect of human
social behavior: deception. Moreover, we show how
a system implementing this framework could dynami-
cally respond once it has detected a lie. We then discuss
some of the challenges associated with deception, end-
ing with an outline of future research directions.
1 Introducing. . .Deception
A bitter reality faces the intelligent system released into the
world: agents lie. Incapable of judging a statement’s verac-
ity, the naif program believes everything it hears. The ma-
chine’s guiding principle is that every interaction provides
a clear and accurate signal of the state of the world. This
assumption, perhaps unfortunately, lacks credibility. People
routinely mask their beliefs and goals to impress others, to
avoid humiliation, to manipulate their circumstances, and
generally to control social situations. Intelligent systems in-
capable of detecting deception may respond inappropriately
to common situations and leave themselves open to poten-
tially disastrous consequences.
Consider a realistic situation initiated when a mother, K,
brings her daughter, S, to the doctor’s ofﬁce. K explains that
S has a history of chronic sinus problems and gastrointesti-
nal pain. This is S’s ﬁfth visit to the doctor this year, and
she has seen three physicians before this one. Moreover, S
has undergone multiple tests and surgical procedures in the
past four years, but K insists that her illnesses continue to
reoccur. The doctor carries out a physical examination and
ﬁnds no apparent medical problems, but K maintains that S
routinely complains of headaches, sinus drainage, abdomi-
nal pain, and nausea. K pleads with the doctor to order new
tests to help diagnose her daughter’s condition. In reality, S
is quite healthy, and K has fabricated her daughter’s illnesses
for years.
This scenario illustrates a particularly heinous form of
deception directed at medical practitioners. The underly-
ing condition is called “fabricated or induced illness” or
“Mu¨nchausen by proxy” and is characterized by a caretaker
who presents their ward for examination, insisting on nonex-
istent or induced symptoms and requesting unnecessary and
potentially invasive medical procedures. The medical liter-
ature contains multiple attempts at explaining the behav-
ior (e.g., seeking attention, asserting power or control), but
acknowledges that detection alone can be difﬁcult (Squires
& Squires 2010). The physician is biased against detection
both by professional ethics that encourage the most suitable
treatment possible and by experience that suggests that par-
ents typically do not manufacture illnesses for their children.
Furthermore, the consequences of false accusations are high.
These and other factors can lead medical professionals to
overlook substantial evidence for fabricated symptoms.
Notably, physicians are counseled that in “making the di-
agnosis of a child as the victim of Mu¨nchausen by proxy, the
motivation of the perpetrator needs to be assessed and under-
stood” (Awadallah et al. 2005). Are ulterior motives driving
the caretaker’s behavior? If so, how should knowledge (or
suspicion) of the motives alter the physician’s mental state?
In Mu¨nchausen by proxy, the motive may be the pursuit of a
distinct psychological reward at the expense of one’s child.
But, unlike other cases where the motives are more apparent
(e.g., to obtain prescription drugs, to avoid incarceration, to
outwit one’s peers) the actual motive of the caretaker is of-
ten a mystery. Even so, knowing only that an ulterior motive
exists (i.e., a known unknown) may be sufﬁcient for an agent
to respond intelligently to the situation.
The need to reason about the motivations of other agents
suggests that a deception savvy system must be able to rep-
resent not only its own beliefs, goals, and intentions, but also
those of the agents with which it interacts. Returning to the
example, the physician may have a belief that S is well and
a belief that K believes that S is ill. However, deception ne-
cessitates the addition of a third layer to the model. Instead
of holding the second belief, the physician may believe that
K has a goal for the physician to believe that S is ill. That is,
K would have the intention to lie in order to produce a false
belief in the doctor who will then satisfy her hidden goal.
This description follows the deﬁnition of lying provided by
Schauer and Zeckhauser (2009) that includes (1) the intent to
deceive by a speaker, (2) the expression of a false statement
by that speaker, and (3) the production of a misrepresenta-
tion of reality in a listener.
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The social act of deception offers a critical challenge
that any approach to mental state ascription (mind-reading)
aspiring to model the richness of human interaction must
address. In this paper, we present a framework for mind-
reading and claim that it can (a) represent dialogs with
both honest and deceptive agents and (b) dynamically ad-
just when lying is detected. The next section describes this
framework and motivates its advantages in the context of re-
lated approaches. We illustrate the richness of the represen-
tation by showing that it can characterize naive and skeptical
agents. We then substantiate the framework’s ﬂexibility us-
ing examples wherein an agent’s attitude dynamically shifts
from trust to suspicion. Finally, we discuss the limits of this
research and future directions.
2 Agents and Their Simulacra
Mind-reading is the process of attributing mental states
to other agents. For a physician to detect Mu¨nchausen by
proxy, he must perform complex inferences about the perpe-
trator’s mental states. This process requires reasoning about
the caretaker’s beliefs, her goals, and her intentions. The
physician’s model must be dynamic, that is, have the abil-
ity to change its attribution of mental states to the perpetra-
tor as evidence accumulates. Furthermore, inferences over
the model must take place in real time if they are to guide
dialog performance.
A Few Standard Frameworks
Scientists and philosophers usally develop models of mind-
reading against the general backdrop of theory of mind,
which analyzes an agent’s mental state in terms of beliefs,
desires, and intentions. Researchers across ﬁelds have ex-
plored theory of mind, with the most extensive work appear-
ing in the psychological literature. There, behavior on tasks
that involve increasingly sophisticated reasoning about other
agents marks the stages of child development (e.g., Well-
man 1990). In artiﬁcial intelligence, theory of mind has in-
spired architectures for reasoning about other agents (Rao &
Georgeff 1995). However, these approaches provide a static
framework for describing other agents and must be extended
with dynamics to develop a real-time model of reasoning
about other agents.
One approach to the dynamics of belief can be found in
the literature on belief revision (Alchourro´n et al. 1985).
This work explores procedures for updating databases or,
more generally, theories as new evidence accumulates. Al-
though this approach is suitably dynamic, it does not ex-
plicitly model the mental states of other agents. Information
sources can be treated with varying degrees of skepticism or
trust, but this assessment is not inferred dynamically from
the incoming signals themselves as it is in the Mu¨nchausen
by proxy example.
A related approach which does explicitly model the belief
states of multiple agents can be found in the literature on
dynamic epistemic logic (van Ditmarsch et al. 2008). This
approach can explicitly represent the modalities of belief
and knowledge for multiple agents in its syntax. However,
much of the work in this tradition, including the fragment
called public announcement logic (Baltag et al. 1998), an-
alyzes changes in belief attribution on the assumption that
utterances are veridical. Although recent work has explored
variants of dynamic epistemic logic strong enough to deﬁne
deception, there is as yet no approach to detecting deception
within this tradition (e.g., Sakama et al. 2010).
Both strategies employ a Lewis-style semantics based
on a structured set of worlds (Lewis 1973). Changes in
the model involve reordering worlds, subtracting worlds,
or changing the accessibility relation between worlds. The
guiding principle behind this model is that new information
reduces the number of possible worlds. Conceptually, this
approach is a powerful analysis of the nature of information,
but it is impractical as a concrete suggestion for a computa-
tionally tractable representational framework.
Our goal is to develop a framework which both (a) explic-
itly performs the task of mind-reading and (b) is computa-
tionally tractable. This means that the mental states of other
agents will need to be explicitly represented so that they are
available to inference mechanisms. It also means, however,
that we need to restrict attention to inference procedures that
can execute in real time. Our general strategy here is to take
an approach opposite to that of possible worlds semantics.
Rather than beginning with a representation of all possibili-
ties that a system would then contract, we will only explic-
itly represent beliefs ascribed to other agents as they are gen-
erated during dialogue.
A Socially Aware Framework
Our framework for mind-reading follows in the tradition
of ViewGen, developed by Ballim and Wilks (1991). Their
approach organizes propositional content into environments
that represent either topics that beliefs may be about or views
that an agent may have. Drawing from one of their examples
(p. 155), ViewGen may have beliefs about John that he is
male and six feet tall. Additionally, the system may believe
about John that John believes that his cat is nice. That is, the
topic environment of John has a nested view environment
that represents John’s perspective.
Importantly, nested views inherit the beliefs of their sur-
rounding environments, which means that in this example,
ViewGen also believes that John believes himself to be male
and six feet tall. In principle, beliefs are stored in the outer-
most view to which they are ascribed and explicit negation
in nested environments can block inheritance. Most impor-
tantly, the system incorporates a mechanism that dynami-
cally adds beliefs to the correct environment and one that
resolves questions of ascription by following well deﬁned
chains of inheritance.
Our framework differs from ViewGen in three key ways.
First, our approach lacks support for topics, but we plan to
incorporate representationally richer versions of these, sim-
ilar to Cyc microtheories (Lenat 1998), in the near future.
Second, ViewGen supports two forms of reasoning: perco-
lation, which moves propositions from nested views out-
wards, and ascription, which controls the visibility of propo-
sitions within nested views. Both mechanisms are important,
and here we assume ascription through default reasoning
as in ViewGen. However, we supplement ViewGen’s two
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Doctor
Beliefs
(sick Patient)
(has-cold Patient)
Intentions
Goals
Patient
Beliefs
(has-ﬂu Patient)
(not (has-cold Patient))
Intentions
Goals
Figure 1: A doctor modeling the mental state of a patient.
The outer boxes represent agent partitions, and the inner
boxes represent the memory partitions that comprise each
agent’s mental state.
forms of reasoning with an abductive reasoner (Bridewell
& Langley 2011) to create a general approach to socially
aware inference. Third, we follow Lee’s (1998) example
and move beyond ViewGen’s principal emphasis on belief
to treat agents as complex structures that contain separate
memory partitions for beliefs, goals, and intentions.
With this descriptive context in mind, we consolidate our
framework as follows. An agent is represented by a men-
tal space that is partitioned into models of agents, one of
which is a privileged model of the self. Each agent model is
partitioned into three sets of mental objects: beliefs, goals,
and intentions. Beliefs are factual content that can be true or
false. Goals are states of the world that the agent would like
to bring about. Intentions are actions that may be realized
in pursuit of a goal. Each primitive mental object consists
of a literal that represents content and additional tags that
indicate its source, its entrenchment, and other information.
The modality of the tagged object is determined by where it
is stored, and implicitly, intentions and goals are reﬂectively
indexible as beliefs about intentions or goals.
When agent A1 talks with another agent A2, A1 gener-
ates a model of its conversational partner and connects that
model to A1’s belief partition. This model represents A1’s
beliefs about A2. A1 can access its beliefs about A2 through
special operators such as (B A2 <content>) or (B A2 (G
<content>)) where B, G, and I represent operators that ac-
cess the belief, goal, and intention partitions of the speciﬁed
agent. Since we index goals and intentions as beliefs, only
the belief operator requires an agent argument.
As we mentioned, beliefs are inherited in nested agents
by default. Therefore, when A1 generates its model of A2,
only those beliefs that differ from those of A1 are explicitly
added to A2. Additionally, all agents share the same infer-
ence rules, which are stored with the principal agent. This
lets agent A1 take A2’s perspective by applying the same
inference rules inside A2’s model.
To illustrate this representation, consider the model in
Figure 1. Here we have a principal agent, Doctor, who is rea-
soning about another agent, Patient. For simplicity, we omit
goals and intentions, but show placeholders for their parti-
tions. In this case, the doctor would ascribe (sick Patient)
to both the doctor and the patient, (has-ﬂu Patient) and (not
(has-cold Patient)) only to the patient, and (has-cold Patient)
only to the doctor. Note that the framework uses a default
rule to ascribe (sick Patient) to the patient, but (not (has-cold
Patient)) blocks the doctor’s ascription of (has-cold Patient)
to the patient. In general, we could also deﬁne constraints
that assert mutually exclusive relationships to augment ex-
plicit negation and block ascription through default reason-
ing. Moreover, this example is limited to a case where the
doctor has beliefs about the patient’s mental state. As later
examples will illustrate, an agent may also have goals for
another’s beliefs, goals, and intentions.
Although we will not employ this feature in our analy-
sis of deception, notice that this approach supports basic
self awareness. That means that the model also represents
(B Doctor (sick Patient))), (B Patient (B Patient (has-ﬂu Pa-
tient)))), and so forth. Since the patient lacks its own explicit
model of the doctor, we assume that the patient ascribes all
its beliefs to the doctor. More complex relationships are left
as future research.
3 Modeling Deceptive Interactions
To demonstrate the representational power of this frame-
work, we apply it to four medical situations of increasing
complexity. Each hypothetical situation involves a physi-
cian and a patient in dialog during an emergency department
visit. The physician is the principal agent. The ﬁrst two situa-
tions are identical in content, but the physician prejudges the
trustworthiness of the patient differently. Those two models
exemplify extreme endpoints for a principal agent’s attitude:
complete naivete or complete skepticism. The third situa-
tion presents the same scenario, but here the physician starts
out as a naive agent, detects that the patient is lying, and dy-
namically adjusts her mental state to support skepticism. The
fourth situation revisits the Mu¨nchausen by proxy scenario
described in Section 1.
The Naif and the Skeptic
Consider the following dialog between a physician and a pa-
tient, which reﬂects an experience commonly encountered in
emergency departments.
Scenario 1
Physician: “Tell me what’s wrong.”
Patient: “I have a terrible headache!”
Physician: “Have you tried pain relievers like Tylenol?”
Patient: “Oh no, doctor, I’m allergic to Tylenol.”
Patient: “Last time, Vicodin really helped.”
Physician: “. . .”
Superﬁcially this interaction seems reasonable. The patient
describes a symptom, warns the doctor of a relevant allergy,
and mentions past successful treatment. However, two im-
portant pieces of domain knowledge reveal an interesting
subtext. First, Vicodin is a trade name for a combination of
hydrocodone, a controlled narcotic, and acetaminophen, a
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Physician
Beliefs
(has-headache patient)
(allergic patient tylenol)
(effective patient vicodin)
(allergic patient vicodin)
Goals
(treated patient)
Intentions
(give patient vicodin)
Physician(a)
(b)
Beliefs
(has-headache patient)
(allergic patient tylenol) Goals
(treated patient)
Intentions
Figure 2: A snapshot of a naive agent’s mental state in Sce-
nario 1 (a) after the patient asserts an allergy to Tylenol and
(b) after the patient requests Vicodin.
common analgesic. Second, Tylenol is a trade name for ac-
etaminophen. In this context, the patient’s dialog suggests
that he may be lying and engaging in drug seeking behavior
to serve his addiction.
In Situation 1, we analyze this scenario by modeling the
physician as a naive agent, one who makes a blanket as-
sumption of veridicality. Figure 2 shows such an agent’s po-
tential mental state both after the patient states his allergy
and after he requests Vicodin and the physician identiﬁes a
conﬂict. Here we are not modeling knowledge necessary to
control the dialog, so the assumption of truth obviates the
need for an explicit model of the patient. Instead, the physi-
cian collects facts about the world and processes them as she
deems ﬁt.
In Figure 2a, we see that the physician has accepted the
patient’s report of having a headache and established a goal
to treat the patient. Additionally, the physician has accepted
the patient’s allergy. Figure 2b shows a later state, which
now contains conﬂicting beliefs. By this point, the physi-
cian has accepted the patient’s claim that Vicodin was an
effective treatment and has formed the intention to adminis-
ter Vicodin, (give patient vicodin). However, continued in-
ference has produced the belief (allergic patient vicodin),
which contradicts (effective patient vicodin). At this point,
the physician must resolve the conﬂict in order to act appro-
priately. One potential solution is to err on the side of cau-
tion by removing the intention to administer vicodin and by
suggesting another pain medication such as ibuprofen. Re-
gardless of the response, this model cannot support a general
approach to detecting and responding to the deception.
In Situation 2, we model the physician in this scenario
as an intrinsically skeptical agent who never accepts the pa-
tient’s statements at face value. For instance, such a situ-
ation might occur if, before seeing the patient, the physi-
cian met with a nurse who mentioned that the patient is a
known addict who routinely visits the hospital seeking nar-
cotics. In this case, the physician would not directly accept
the patient’s statements as beliefs. Figure 3 shows the poten-
Patient
Beliefs
Goals
Intentions
Physician
Beliefs
(has-headache patient)
(allergic patient tylenol)
(effective patient vicodin) Goals
Intentions
(give patient vicodin)
Physician
Beliefs
Goals
(treated patient)
Intentions
Figure 3: A snapshot of a skeptical agent’s mental state af-
ter Scenario 1. Arrows connect agent partitions letting the
physician explicitly store beliefs about the patient’s mental
state and the patient’s goals for the physician’s mental state.
tial mental state of this skeptical physician after the dialog.
To emphasize the relationship between agents, we leave out
some of the inference details.
In this model, the physician retains the goal to treat the
patient, but skepticism has led to the creation of two new
agent partitions. The ﬁrst stores the physician’s beliefs about
the patient’s mental state. This degree of removal is help-
ful when an agent holds false beliefs or when two agents
disagree. As an example, the physician may have a record
of the patient receiving acetaminophen without complica-
tions and might infer that the patient is confused. The second
stores the patient’s goals for the physician’s beliefs. For in-
stance, when the patient says, “I have a terrible headache!”
instead of accepting this statement at face value, the skep-
tical physician explicitly interprets this as a belief that the
patient would like the physician to hold: (B Patient (G (B
Physician (has-headache Patient)))). This extra layer of rep-
resentation lets the principal agent decide whether to trust
each statement’s content.
Figure 3 also demonstrates an advantage of our frame-
work that plays a role in detecting deception. The inten-
tion (give patient vicodin) results from mental simulation,
which involves an agent reasoning from an alternative per-
spective.1 In this case, the skeptical physician assumed the
perspective of the nested physician model, which also inher-
its the (treated patient) goal, and inferred the intention to ad-
minister Vicodin. Continued inference in this context would
produce the mental state from Figure 2b. From that point,
the skeptical agent must decide whether to accept the be-
liefs about allergies, the belief about effectiveness, or none
of those and then act accordingly.
Detecting Deception
So far, we have used our framework to model unrealistic
agents. Neither the naif nor the skeptic can respond effec-
1This operation is directly related to the application of mi-
crotheories in Cyc (Lenat 1998).
53
Patient
Beliefs
Goals
(intoxicated patient)
Intentions
Physician
Beliefs
(has-headache patient)
(allergic patient tylenol)
(effective patient vicodin)
(allergic patient vicodin)
Goals
Intentions
(give patient vicodin)
Physician
Beliefs
Goals
(treated patient)
Intentions
Figure 4: A snapshot of the physician’s mental state after
detecting deception.
tively in all social contexts. Regardless, most if not all frame-
works for intelligent systems fall into the naive category. Hu-
mans fall somewhere between these two extremes, taking
most people at face value and reacting appropriately when
they realize that they are being deceived. As a result, we
need to demonstrate that our framework can adapt its cogni-
tive structures to respond to an uncovered or suspected lie.
Situation 3 revisits Scenario 1 by initially modeling the
physician as a naive agent as in Situation 1. Eventually, this
leads to the state shown in Figure 2b where the physician
intends to give the patient Vicodin and has just inferred the
contradictory belief that the patient is allergic to the drug.
At this point, a system implementing the framework would
enter a belief revision routine to update its mental state ac-
cordingly. This step may take a number of forms including
removing one of the contradictory beliefs, altering the exist-
ing intention, or treating the interaction as deceptive. Here
we explore this last case, shifting from our speciﬁc model of
a physician to mechanisms in a cognitive system.
Before modeling the effects of the transition, we need to
specify the conditions under which the system might detect
deception. In this paper, we assume that a speaker lies to
achieve one or more ulterior motives and that an agent may
possess an ulterior motive if one can explain its statements
with multiple, unrelated goals. In the current example, Vi-
codin and Tylenol satisfy many of the same goals due to their
shared ingredient even though the former may be more po-
tent than the latter. Over and above their shared effects, Vi-
codin as a narcotic achieves the unique goal of intoxication,
which provides an ulterior motive for the patient’s request.
Importantly, the mere potential for an ulterior motive is
insufﬁcient for one to detect deception without appearing
paranoid or accusatory. However, once a system detects a
contradiction in an agent’s beliefs, the presence of an ulte-
rior motive offers a heuristic for selecting a particular be-
lief revision strategy. In this situation, the system responds
plausibly by becoming skeptical toward the speaker. Recall
that the skeptical agent protected its own beliefs by creat-
Patient
Beliefs
Goals
(intoxicated patient)
Intentions
Physician
Beliefs
(has-headache patient)
(allergic patient tylenol)
(effective patient vicodin) Goals
Intentions
(give patient vicodin)
Physician
Beliefs
(drug-seeking patient) 
Goals
(treated patient)
Intentions
(recommend-rehab patient)
Figure 5: A snapshot of the physician’s mental state after
responding to deception.
ing a separate partition to house the suspected lies. Here we
demonstrate the shift from the memory partitions shown for
the naive agent in Figure 2b to ones similar to those of the
skeptic shown in Figure 3.
The initial step in this procedure involves the hypotheti-
cal system transferring the mental objects supported by sus-
pected lies from the principal agent’s partition to the nested
partition. This shift enables the system to reason about de-
ception. After the transition process, the system is free to
infer the patient’s ulterior motive, (B Patient (G (intoxicated
patient))). Figure 4 shows the results. (G (treated patient))
was left alone because it was supported by the context of the
physician–patient relationship and not by the dialog content.
Once the structures are in place, the system can remove
inferred beliefs that contradict stated ones and continue rea-
soning about the situation. Ultimately, the physician might
reach the state shown in Figure 5, identifying the patient as
a drug seeker and forming the intention to recommend a re-
hab clinic as a way to satisfy (G (treated patient)).
Having described how our framework can represent de-
ception and be used by a system to detect deception, we
now revisit our original motivating example in Situation 4.
Detecting deception in Mu¨nchausen by proxy differs qual-
itatively from the drug seeking scenario because the care-
taker’s ulterior motives are unknown. It seems unreasonable
to limit the detection of deception to cases with a speciﬁc
ulterior motive. Consider the following dialog, which is an
adaptation of the example from Section 1.
Scenario 2
Physician: “Tell me what’s wrong.”
Caretaker: “My daughter has chronic sinus problems.”
Caretaker: “She always gets these headaches.”
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Caretaker: “She also has constant sinus drainage.”
Physician: “What have you tried?”
Caretaker: “She’s seen three doctors so far.”
Caretaker: “She’s had sinus surgery twice.”
(Physician carries out exam)
Physician: “Your daughter appears ﬁne right now.”
Caretaker: “She always has headaches and drainage.”
Caretaker: “Can you get an x-ray to see for certain?”
Physician: “. . .”
Figure 6 shows the physician’s mental state at the end
of the dialog. During the examination, the physician no-
ticed that the patient seemed healthy, with no evidence of a
headache or sinus drainage. Since the physical exam contra-
dicted the caretaker’s claims, the physician’s mental model
needed adjustment. In this case the physician retains be-
liefs supported by the exam, but moves the mental objects
supported by the caretaker’s statements into the secondary
model. Even though there were no ulterior motives to in-
ﬂuence belief revision, the model takes a form similar to
one generated after detecting deception. This restructuring
is plausible because it lets one represent conﬂicting infor-
mation from two separate, but supposedly reliable, sources.
The caretaker’s empty—apart from the linked agent—goal
partition indicates the absence of an ulterior motive. In this
case, the caretaker inherits the goal (healthy patient) from
the physician.
Furthermore, the physician’s goal (healthy patient) is sat-
isﬁed by an existing belief. This state justiﬁes moving the in-
tention (order-test x-ray patient) to the nested agent because
taking that action, which suggests an unhealthy patient, is
inconsistent with having a patient who is well. In addition,
the caretaker’s insistance that her daughter is unwell after
the physician evaluated her health has led to the inference of
(B Caretaker (I (insist-unhealthy patient)). Again, this alone
is insufﬁcient to infer deception even though there is contin-
ued disagreement between the agents. Instead, from the as-
criptions (healthy patient), (B Caretaker (I (insist-unhealthy
patient))), and (B Caretaker (G (B Physician (I (order-test
x-ray patient))))), the physician could infer (B Caretaker
(G (order-unnecessary-test x-ray patient))) without assess-
ing the caretaker’s honesty.
Finally, one may infer from a caretaker’s goal to or-
der unnecessary tests on their ward that the caretaker has
Mu¨nchausen by proxy. That diagnosis then lends itself to de-
tecting, post hoc, that deception has occurred—an inversion
of the previous scenario, where the detection of deception
assisted in the recognition of drug seeking behavior. Never-
theless, the caretaker’s ulterior motive remains a mystery as
it typically is neither to harm her ward nor to instigate tests
for their own sake. Instead, the cause is likely related to a
psychological need.
This section applied our proposed framework for socially
aware inference to two scenarios involving lies. In each case,
we used the framework to represent various mental states
of a principal agent as it interpreted the content of a dia-
log. Furthermore, we identiﬁed boundary cases of skepti-
cism and naivete and introduced a means by which a belief
revision routine might detect and respond to a deceptive sit-
Caretaker
Beliefs
Goals
      ??
Intentions
(insist-unhealthy patient)
Physician
Beliefs
(has-sinusitis patient)
(has-headaches patient)
(has-drainage patient) Goals
Intentions
(order-test x-ray patient)
Physician
Beliefs
(healthy patient)
(repeated-exams patient)
(repeated-surgery patient)
(not (has-sinusitis patient)
(not (has-headaches patient))
(not (has-drainage patient))
Goals
(healthy patient)
Intentions
Figure 6: A snapshot of the physician’s mental state while
interacting with a caretaker who has Munchausen by proxy.
uation. The Mu¨nchausen by proxy scenario exempliﬁes an
interesting challenge for systems that detect lies, absence of
an explicit ulterior motive, and suggests that there are other
challenges for researchers to explore in the future. The next
section discusses some of these in limited detail.
4 Deception, Ignorance, and False Beliefs
The scenarios in Section 3 dealt with deception, and one
type of deception in particular. In each case, the patient was
lying, which we earlier deﬁned as involving the speaker’s
intent, false content, and the listener’s response. However,
other forms of deception, including bullshit and paltering
also deserve attention from the cognitive systems commu-
nity. According to Frankfurt (2005), bullshitters, unlike liars,
are unconcerned with the veridicality of their statements and
therefore have no intent to deceive. Instead, their intent is to
hide their own disconcern for the truth. In contrast, palter-
ing includes lies of omission, where the speaker leaves out
the truth or asserts a partial truth (Schauer & Zeckhauser
2009). Additionally, details remain to be worked out in or-
der to tease apart the interplay between the intent to lie (and
deception, in general) and other mental states, such as false
belief and ignorance.
To give an example of false belief, consider a modiﬁcation
to Scenario 1 where the drugs involved are the analgesics
Advil and Motrin.
Scenario 3
Physician: “Tell me what’s wrong.”
Patient: “I have a terrible headache!”
Physician: “Have you tried pain relievers like Advil?”
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Patient: “Oh no, doctor, I’m allergic to Advil.”
Patient: “Last time, Motrin really helped.”
Physician: “. . .”
As in the Tylenol–Vicodin case, the medications mentioned
here share the same ingredient, this time ibuprofen, and the
patient’s claims are inconsistent. The fundamental differ-
ence is that, in this scenario, neither medication contains a
narcotic or other recreational pharmaceutical. The lack of
this additional factor prevents inference to an ulterior mo-
tive, and the physician is free to infer a false belief. For in-
stance, the patient may have misremembered a prior allergic
reaction or may have been confused about the drug names.
Although the deﬁnitions of false belief and deception clearly
differ, correctly distinguishing instances of each presents a
difﬁcult challenge for the research community.
Ignorance differs from false belief in that for some propo-
sition p that holds in the world, the agent with false belief
will explicitly hold ¬p, whereas the ignorant agent will hold
neither p nor¬p. In conversation, however, agents may make
statements that they do not actually believe as way to cover
their ignorance. At ﬁrst, the response resembles bullshit, but
unlike the bullshitter, the ignorant agent may value veridical-
ity. Suppose a doctor asks, “Are you allergic to ibuprofen?”
The patient may respond, “Yes,” not because he knows what
ibuprofen refers to and is aware of an allergy, but because he
does not want to appear ignorant by asking for clariﬁcation.
The content of the question suggests erring on the side of
caution, so the patient provides a meek response.
Ignorance and false belief are superﬁcially similar in that
they may lead to the same inconsistent statements. Never-
theless, our framework can model them differently due to its
ability to represent mental states. Still, dynamically differ-
entiating between the two may require actions on the part
of the agent, such as cross-checking the statement or asking
more pointed questions. Handling this distinction as well as
those amongst other forms of deception including bullshit-
ting and paltering is a matter for future investigation.
5 Future Research and Conclusion
The computational framework that we introduced shows
promise, but more research is required to meet our goal of a
socially aware cognitive system. The obvious next steps are
to implement the framework and to connect it to an infer-
ence system. Past experience in this direction has led us to
conclude that the integration must be deep enough that the
inference system can work directly with the memory par-
titions and navigate them as it reasons. The primary chal-
lenge here is the non-monotonic inheritance of mental con-
tent from one agent partition to another. A reasonable solu-
tion will involve ﬁnding the right balance between the valid-
ity of the ascriptions and computational complexity. We con-
jecture that an abductive reasoner, such as AbRA (Bridewell
& Langley 2011), will cope better with this problem than
deductive approaches which are known to be brittle when
faced with inconsistency.
As we continue to develop and implement this frame-
work, we also recognize the need to formalize its behavior.
We would like to have a declarative theory of deception that
supports detection and distinguishes it from false belief and
ignorance. Sakama et al. (2010) have made some progress
in this direction, but their approach is still limited to static
deﬁnitions of deception. Additionally, Lee (1998) character-
izes deception and false belief using an extended version of
ViewGen, but he emphasizes ruling out these conditions in
order to justify the inference of pragmatic implicatures in di-
alogs. Both models need substantial adaptations to treat the
effects of a recognized (or suspected) lie on the mental state
of an agent.
In this paper, we developed a framework for socially
aware inference and introduced deception as a topic for cog-
nitive systems research. Additionally, we identiﬁed naivete
and skepticism as distinct agent attitudes toward deception
plausibly encountered in realistic scenarios. Moreover, we
demonstrated how models in our framework can represent
these attitudes and dynamically adjust between them in re-
sponse to deception. Finally, we brieﬂy discussed the chal-
lenges involved in distinguishing deception from states pro-
ducing similar behavior, such as false belief. The existence
of examples such as Mu¨nchausen by proxy demonstrates
that any effective, plausible framework for mind-reading
cannot assume the veridicality of an agent’s statements and,
instead, must possess the ability to model and detect com-
plex deceptive behavior.
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